Trump Russia Strategy: Business Deals Before Ukraine Peace

Trump Russia strategy turns to carrot and stick! Carrot and stick? President Donald Trump’s administration is considering a striking new Trump Russia strategy in its effort to end the war in Ukraine: hit Moscow with potentially devastating new sanctions while simultaneously dangling lucrative U.S.-Russian business deals in front of Vladimir Putin — possibly even before the fighting stops.

The approach could alarm Ukraine and its European allies, which have consistently argued that greater military and economic pressure, rather than new financial incentives, is the best way to force Putin into serious concessions. According to The New York Times, however, Trump’s negotiators are now considering whether opening the door to business ties could convince the Kremlin that Washington is serious about a long-term reset in relations.

That would represent a notable shift from Trump’s previous position. Last year, the president said Russia wanted to resume business with the United States but insisted that commercial deals would have to wait until the Ukraine war was settled. Now, people close to the negotiations say agreements could potentially move forward before a final peace deal if Moscow demonstrates enough restraint.

Kushner challenges Putin over Donbas claims

The rethink comes after more than 18 months of Trump-led attempts to negotiate an end to Europe’s bloodiest conflict since World War II. His key envoys, real estate developer Steve Witkoff and Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, met Putin in Moscow on September 5 for more than three hours. Reuters reported that the discussions included not only possible ways to settle the Ukraine conflict but also major potential economic projects between Russia and the United States.

The New York Times described one particularly revealing exchange. Putin reportedly projected confidence, telling the Americans that Russian forces would capture the entire Donbas within months while intensifying attacks on Ukraine’s energy grid ahead of winter. Kushner pushed back, noting that Putin had made essentially the same prediction a year earlier.

“What are the chances we come back here in another year and you are again saying the same thing?” Kushner asked, according to the Times. “Maybe we don’t lose a year?”

The exchange captured the central problem confronting Trump’s negotiators. Russia continues to demand Ukrainian territorial concessions that Kyiv refuses to accept, while Moscow has so far been unable to achieve all of its stated objectives on the battlefield. Witkoff and Kushner therefore appear to be searching for additional incentives that could alter Putin’s calculations without requiring Ukraine simply to surrender territory Russia has failed to conquer.

Billions in business could become the carrot

Exactly what Washington might offer remains unclear. Kremlin foreign-policy adviser Yuri Ushakov said after the September 5 meeting that the sides discussed “potential major mutually beneficial Russian-American projects” in considerable detail.

The possibilities previously floated by Russian officials are potentially enormous. Moscow has promoted joint ventures involving rare earth minerals, aluminum, Arctic development and energy, while Russian officials have even raised the prospect of American companies becoming involved in the sale of Russian natural gas to Europe.

For the Kremlin, access to American capital, technology and commercial partnerships could eventually provide a path out of years of economic isolation. For Trump, those projects could become negotiating leverage: demonstrate that peace could bring Russia major economic rewards while continued war could bring much harsher punishment.

The problem is timing. Signing major commercial agreements before a ceasefire would give Russia benefits while its military is still fighting inside Ukraine. That would reverse the sequence Trump himself previously described, when he said Moscow was “not doing business until we get the war settled.”

Congress prepares the stick

At almost exactly the same moment, Congress is moving in the opposite direction. The House passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 by 262 votes to 159 this week, sending it to Trump after previous Senate approval. The legislation was championed by the late Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham and is designed to increase economic pressure on Russia’s energy and defense sectors.

The most explosive provision gives Trump authority to impose tariffs of as much as 100 percent on countries that continue buying large quantities of Russian oil or gas. India and China, two of Moscow’s most important energy customers, could be particularly exposed. Trump has indicated that he intends to sign the legislation.

India already faces a painful choice. New Delhi relies heavily on discounted Russian crude but also depends on access to the U.S. market. Reuters reported Friday that the new legislation could force Prime Minister Narendra Modi to choose between maintaining those Russian energy purchases and protecting broader trade ties with Washington.

The sanctions could strike directly at one of Putin’s most important sources of war revenue. Yet the global energy picture complicates the strategy. Russia’s ESPO crude has surged above $120 per barrel amid supply disruptions caused by the Middle East war, while Urals crude has climbed toward $110. Restricting Russian exports further could therefore put additional upward pressure on global oil prices even as Washington tries to cut Moscow’s earnings.

Pressure and rewards at the same time

The result is an unusual two-track policy. Congress is handing Trump a powerful economic weapon against Putin while Trump’s own negotiators are exploring incentives that could reopen parts of the U.S.-Russian economic relationship.

A U.S. official told the Times that early commercial deals might convince powerful figures around Putin — including hard-liners skeptical of the United States — that Trump genuinely wants a different relationship with Moscow. In that sense, the administration appears to be testing whether economic opportunity can generate internal pressure on the Kremlin for an eventual settlement.

Former EU diplomat Balazs Jarabik told the newspaper that Washington appeared to be considering larger concessions toward Russia than previously contemplated. He said some agreements might move forward if Moscow first demonstrated “concrete restraint,” whereas Washington had earlier resisted such deals before a ceasefire.

The strategy could therefore be less contradictory than it initially appears: Trump could threaten Russia’s economic lifelines while simultaneously showing Putin what could become available if he changes course. But the effectiveness of that approach depends almost entirely on whether Moscow views the promised benefits as conditional rewards rather than something it can obtain while continuing the war.

Expert warns deals could prolong the war

Political scientist Scott Erb, a professor at the University of Maine at Farmington who specializes in international relations, American foreign policy and European affairs, is skeptical that the approach will succeed.

“I do not know what to make of Trump’s idea to apparently give Russia incentives through business deals even before an agreement is signed to end the war,” Erb told America Report.

He argues that Trump’s previous attempts to negotiate major foreign-policy deals provide little reason for confidence that economic incentives will produce the desired Russian concessions.

“I do not have confidence that this will work,” Erb said. “It could in fact give Putin the capacity to push on with the war even longer.”

That is also the central fear in Kyiv and among many of Ukraine’s European supporters: economic normalization before Russian forces stop fighting could provide Moscow with new revenues, investment prospects and political legitimacy without securing a lasting peace.

Erb: Putin may also be vulnerable

Erb nevertheless sees another possibility. He believes Putin may now be operating from a weaker position than the Russian leader’s confident rhetoric suggests, making the combination of economic pressure and incentives potentially more effective than either policy alone.

“I do think Putin is in a weakened state now, so it is hard to predict,” Erb said. “It’s possible that this carrot-and-stick approach could work.”

That uncertainty is reflected on the battlefield. Putin has repeatedly projected confidence that Russia can eventually secure its territorial objectives, yet the war has continued far longer than Moscow initially expected. Kushner’s reported challenge in the Kremlin was effectively an attempt to call Putin’s bluff: if Russia is really only months away from achieving its goals, why has Putin been making similar forecasts for so long?

Still, Erb remains skeptical about whether Trump’s foreign-policy team can successfully manage such a delicate balance of threats and rewards.

“I have no confidence that President Trump has a competent or well-informed foreign-policy team,” he said, describing that as his assessment of the administration. “I am skeptical of this approach and fear that it is based on wishful thinking.”

Europe sees a very different path to peace

European governments and Ukraine have generally argued for the opposite sequence: first increase sanctions and military pressure until Russia agrees to meaningful concessions, then discuss normalization and economic rewards.

That disagreement could become increasingly important if Washington begins negotiating commercial projects while Russian troops remain inside Ukraine. It would also deepen a broader debate over how much economic isolation should survive any eventual ceasefire and what Moscow would have to do before sanctions are removed.

The new congressional sanctions bill gives Trump enormous leverage if he chooses to use it aggressively. At the same time, the administration’s willingness to discuss business indicates that Trump still sees economic deals as one of his preferred instruments of diplomacy.

For Putin, the message could therefore be stark: continued war may bring new sanctions against Russia and its biggest customers, while a willingness to compromise could reopen access to potentially lucrative American partnerships.

Whether that amounts to sophisticated carrot-and-stick diplomacy or a premature reward for Moscow is now at the heart of the debate over the latest Trump Russia strategy.